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YH: First of all, would you please introduce yourself to the readers of JCS and why you choose 
to study history?  
 
GO: I teach modern British history and the history of science at New York University. I grew up 
in Stone Mountain, Georgia (notoriously home to the Confederate Mount Rushmore, now part of 
the endless suburbs around metropolitan Atlanta), and went to college at the University of 
Georgia. I bounced around between majors during my first year, until I became fascinated by a 
survey of modern European history. The professor of that survey was Kirk Willis, a specialist in 
British intellectual history, and when I carried on in the major, eventually writing an 
undergraduate thesis, I continued working with Dr. Willis. My thesis examined the British 
reaction to the news of the atomic bombings of Japan at the end of World War II (a reaction that 
was remarkably optimistic, with grandiose predictions of atomic cookers and cars, despite the 
destructive nature of atomic energy’s debut), and this topic stimulated an interest in public 
attitudes towards science and scientists more generally. I applied to graduate school to study 
modern British history, cultural and intellectual history, and the history of science, a combination 
that led almost inevitably to Northwestern University (just north of Chicago). There I had the 
chance to learn from a remarkable group of scholars and teachers: Bill Heyck in modern British 
history, Ken Alder in the history of science, John Bushnell in European history, David Joravsky 
in intellectual history, and Alex Owen, Sarah Maza, and Ed Muir in cultural history. I completed 
my dissertation in 2005, and taught at Washington University in St. Louis and the University of 
Virginia, before arriving at NYU in the fall of 2009. 
 
YH: Which are your main interests in this field? 
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GO: My general interests include modern Britain, science and technology, and cultural and 
intellectual history, and more specifically I am interested in such topics as the 1960s (better 
understood, perhaps, as “the Sixties,” since the developments it refers to reach into the following 
decades), the New Left, neo-conservatism, meritocracy, and the problem of national “decline” 
(about which I’ll say more in a moment). I am now becoming interested in certain aspects of 
urban history, especially in the intersection between state planning and Modernist aesthetics 
during the twentieth century, and I continue to work on the history of academic disciplines such 
as history, literary studies, and, currently, modernization theory. Looking over that list, it’s not 
obvious what connects it all together, except to say that one of my preoccupations is the way that 
the history of the recent past can look surprisingly unfamiliar – and that is the case, I think, in the 
history of the “two cultures” controversy, the subject of my first book, and the history of British 
New Towns, the subject of my current research. 
 
YH: This year Cambridge University Press published your book The Two Cultures Controversy: 
Science, Literature and Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain. Congratulations! What are your 
main arguments then?  
 
GO: The book’s main arguments address three objects of study. The first is the notorious 
controversy between the scientist-turned-novelist C. P. Snow and the literary critic F. R. Leavis, 
which began with Snow’s Rede Lecture in Cambridge, The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution, in 1959, reached new heights of acrimony with Leavis’s Richmond Lecture, Two 
Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow, in 1962, and continued intermittently until a final 
exchange in the Times Literary Supplement in 1970. The question I pose is how a topic as 
familiar as the relationship between the arts and the sciences could have generated such 
controversy at this particular moment, and I answer that question by depicting their argument as 
an ideological conflict about competing visions of the past, present, and future. Then, having 
identified, described, and named those rival positions – namely, as competing versions of a 
meritocratic liberalism, one radical and one technocratic – I track the conflict between them in 
arguments over the mission of the university, the methodology of social history, the problem of 
national “decline,” the future of the former British Empire, and the meaning of the Sixties. This 
is what I mean by “cultural politics” in the title of the book – the way that advocates of rival 
ideological positions competed to shape the interpretation of a whole range of issues – and, since 
these efforts took place between 1959 and 1970, this interpretation of the “two cultures” 
controversy also reveals the stakes of cultural politics in Britain during the 1960s more generally. 
 
The second object of study is this period of postwar British history – roughly speaking, the three 
decades following the Second World War. This is not something that I initially intended to 
generalize about, but in writing the book I noticed fundamental similarities between Snow, 
Leavis, and their respective allies, and these similarities became even more evident as the 1960s 
turned into the 1970s. By that time the arguments and persons that had recently commanded 
widespread respect were becoming marginalized, giving the impression that they belonged to 
another era altogether. In their later writings and lectures Snow and Leavis responded to this 
development in identical ways, denouncing what they viewed as a modish concern for equality, 
and unfashionably insisting upon the need for elites of all sorts – indeed, this argument (rather 
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than the discussion of disciplines) comprised the majority of Snow’s final statement on the “two 
cultures” controversy in 1970. Now, if you are thinking that this shift from remarks about 
disciplines to the defense of elites requires some explanation, I entirely agree – and in fact, 
making sense of this development emerged as one of the most interesting challenges in writing 
the book. Snow and Leavis had been born outsiders to the intellectual class, and as a result they 
emerged equally committed to meritocratic principles that promised to open institutions to 
individuals of talent. While this similarity is striking, the difference between them is crucial: 
Snow believed that modern society as it existed in Britain facilitated the realization of the 
individual’s talents, while Leavis insisted that that very society threatened to eradicate the 
capacity for excellence altogether. Nevertheless, both Snow and Leavis believed that society 
should be reformed so to better identify and train intellectual talent, and in this regard they 
shared widespread assumptions about society and culture during the third quarter of the twentieth 
century – a period that I refer to as the “meritocratic moment” in British history. During the 
Sixties these meritocratic commitments came to be challenged by the advocates of more 
egalitarian ideals (for instance, in the areas of secondary and university education), and the 
currency gained by these arguments contributed to the eclipse of the reputations and arguments 
of meritocratic elitists like Snow and Leavis. They responded by adopting steadily more 
embattled tones over the course of the 1970s, and meanwhile a new generation of liberals 
required an alternative explanation for the fact of social inequality: an explanation they found, I 
suggest, in the marketplace thinking that flourished during the final quarter of the century. 
 
The book’s third object of study is the historical tradition discussing the relationship between the 
humanities and the sciences. Familiar installments in that tradition include the argument between 
Matthew Arnold and Thomas Huxley in the 1880s, and the so-called “science wars” of the 1990s, 
but there are many others – indeed, the conversation is very nearly constant, even if its tone only 
occasionally rises to the level that transforms it into a controversy. The Snow-Leavis debate 
represents one of those moments, and its significance within this longer history is that Snow 
provided the language through which this tradition came to be understood: as a conflict between 
“two cultures.” The “two cultures,” of course, are the sciences and humanities (or literature, or 
the arts – it changes over time), but that label is problematic because it organizes our 
understandings of a complicated and various tradition into a tidy dispute about disciplines. I have 
already suggested why I don’t think that characterization explains even the argument between 
Snow and Leavis during the 1960s, much less those of Victorian Britain, 1920s China, late 
twentieth-century America, or anywhere else. So my argument regarding the relationship 
between “two cultures” and this historical tradition is at once negative and positive: negative 
because I argue against the adoption of “two cultures” terms as a way of explaining distinct 
episodes within that tradition, but at the same time positive because the frequent invocation of 
the “two cultures” can remind us to consider what else might be going in an argument ostensibly 
about disciplines. 
 
Those are the three most general arguments of the book, but in addition each chapter makes a 
more specific argument. The first two chapters, on Snow and Leavis, argue that we should 
understand their arguments not primarily as the expressions of disciplinary loyalties, but rather in 
the context of more general ideological positions: for Snow, a technocratic liberalism, and for 
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Leavis, a radical liberalism. The third chapter situates their dispute within Cambridge 
micropolitics at the time, showing that Snow and Leavis both sought to use this moment of 
university transformation to translate their ideological visions into institutional forms; and it 
further shows that their contrary tactics in these efforts – Snow’s clandestine maneuvering, 
Leavis’s obstreperous defiance – were shaped by their contrary conceptions of how politics 
works. The fourth chapter identifies links between this controversy and the simultaneous 
revolution in social history, showing that certain methodological choices (such as whether the 
discipline of history should become more or less like a quantitative social science) were grafted 
onto prior political commitments. The fifth chapter relates the controversy to arguments about 
Britain’s economic decline; it argues that “decline” is just one – and by no means the best – way 
of understanding postwar British history, one that adopts the assumptions not of disinterested 
economic analysis, but rather of a technocratic social critique. The sixth chapter relates the 
controversy to discussions about the future of the former British Empire, arguing that the new 
nation states of Asia and Africa could function in these conversations as imagined terrain: that is, 
as intellectual sites where arguments about Britain’s past, the West’s present, and the world’s 
future all met in one place. And the seventh chapter follows Snow and Leavis as they 
encountered and resisted egalitarian demands, showing that they responded with equivalent 
discomfort, but contrary results, to challenges to their meritocratic commitments: Snow’s 
response led down a path taken by the neo-conservative right, while Leavis’s longstanding 
critique of marketplace thinking rendered his social critique available to the cultural and political 
left. 
 
Generally speaking, then, the main arguments are the ideological (more than disciplinary) 
interpretation of the debate, the meritocratic (rather than declinist) interpretation of postwar 
Britain, and the deconstruction (rather than replication) of the “two cultures” tradition. 
 
YH: Since the first wave of debate shortly after C. P. Snow’s lecture, there has been a large 
accumulation of publications over the last five decades. What make your book different with 
them?  
 
GO: The accumulation has indeed been enormous, and it shows no sign of abating: I would 
estimate that there were scores (if not hundreds) of commentaries in the early 1960s alone, and 
this year – the 50th anniversary of Snow’s lecture – has seen yet another burst. I have written 
elsewhere about the differences between these approaches and my own (Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 39, 2008), which I would summarize by saying that my approach is 
historical. That is, many commentators engage with Snow by adopting, rejecting, or recasting the 
“two cultures” categories, and/or they engage with the exchange between Snow and Leavis by 
defending one side or the other. These approaches might superficially seem different, in that 
some endorse Snow while others denounce him, but from my perspective they are functionally 
similar because they all enter the discussion in which Snow and Leavis took part. I don’t want to 
enter that discussion, I want to analyze it; I am interested not in the ways that Snow speaks to our 
world, but rather in the ways that he testifies to his world. I would not want to insist that this is 
the only sensible approach, but I do think it represents an improvement upon a half-century of 
clichés claiming that the two cultures pose a crisis, or that today’s two cultures are this-and-that, 
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or that some new technology promises to bridge the two cultures, or that there are actually some 
other number of cultures (usually one or three). Snow’s formulation has undeniably succeeded as 
a springboard for such discussions, but my hope is that a historical perspective might nudge 
those discussions forward rather than recycling their claims. 
 
That is the situation regarding what we might think of as journalistic treatments of the 
controversy, but the difference between my book and most academic accounts is more easily 
specified. Again, the question I began with was, “Why did this familiar topic ignite such 
impassioned argument at this particular moment?” There are two predominant answers to that 
question. The first seeks to explain the controversy by adopting Snow’s categories, arguing that 
this was a dispute between advocates of the arts on one side and the sciences on the other, but 
this explanation immediately begins to buckle: by the fact, for instance, that Snow’s supposedly 
pro-scientific, anti-arts argument was championed in such places as the TLS (a literary periodical) 
and challenged in such places as Nature (a scientific journal); or by the fact that Leavis’s 
supposedly anti-scientific, pro-arts argument was championed by the scientists Michael Yudkin 
and Michael Polanyi, and challenged by the writers William Gerhardi and Edith Sitwell. In other 
words, there must be some explanation other than a collision between disciplinary interests, and 
so a second predominant answer to my initial question situates Snow and Leavis within a longer 
tradition discussing the arts and the sciences. This explanation has rather more going for it, but it 
cannot be the whole story, not least because the very existence of this tradition itself begs the 
question of why the topic should have exploded into such rancor at this particular moment. I 
conclude, therefore, that disciplinary tensions inflamed the debate, and that the historical 
tradition informed the debate, but also that something more was going on in the Snow-Leavis 
controversy. That “something more,” I suggest, is politics. 
 
So of all that has been written about Snow, Leavis, and the “two cultures” controversy in the past 
fifty years, I situate my approach in the company of five scholars in particular. Without going 
into detail on the arguments of each (something I discuss in the Studies essay cited above), I 
would identify David Cannadine, Stefan Collini, David Edgerton, David Hollinger, and Ian 
MacKillop as the scholars from whom I have learned the most. I locate my book in relation to 
their work, and in that context perhaps its most immediate contribution – in addition to its 
characterizations and explanations of the ideological positions in the debate – is its archival 
approach. By drawing from private papers in a dozen collections on both sides of the Atlantic, 
my book shows how the positions in the “two cultures” debate structured alliances and 
arguments across a whole range of issues at the same time. The result is in part a history of the 
argument between Snow and Leavis, but it also uses their argument to contribute to our 
understandings of the larger issues that I mentioned above: university expansion, discipline 
formation, the “decline” debate, post-imperial Britain, and the Sixties. This kind of analysis only 
becomes possible once the “two cultures” terms are historicized rather than adopted, and for that 
reason I find the work of these five scholars especially insightful and generative. 
 
YH: What is the relation between Snow-Leavis controversy and Arnold-Huxley debate, 
Science-Metaphysics debate (1923-24, China), and the more recently, the Science Wars? Are 
they variations of one single theme, or totally different concerns and intentions? 
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GO: You have identified exactly the right poles, between variations on a theme and totally 
different concerns, and if neither extreme is satisfactory the question becomes how we negotiate 
between them. Because of what I think is a tendency among intellectual historians to err on the 
side of the former – that is, to treat the exchange between Snow and Leavis as an iteration (often 
an unseemly iteration) of a larger discussion – it is imperative to begin by insisting on the 
distinctions between debates taking place in very different times and places (and the 1920s 
debate in China testifies to the importance of that distinction more clearly still). For example, if 
we want to understand the Anglo-American controversy over Alan Sokal’s hoax at the expense of 
cultural studies during the 1990s, it is not especially helpful to relate Professor Sokal’s argument 
to Snow’s work for the Labour Party during the 1960s – which is an extreme way of saying that 
superficial similarities between very different episodes should not distract attention from the 
ways that these arguments reflect the concerns of their own time and place. Once that point is 
acknowledged, and distinct arguments are not collapsed together, we can turn to consider the 
ways that the memories of past disputes shape the form and interpretation of subsequent 
installments. So neither variations on a theme (which would be ahistorical), nor totally different 
concerns (which would ignore the existence of a tradition), but rather historically distinct 
episodes whose content and interpretation are informed by the tradition of which they are a part. 
 
There is actually a parallel here in the historiography of European revolutions. I remember being 
asked on my comprehensive examination in graduate school whether the Russian Revolution was 
the logical culmination of the French Revolution. The notion of “logic” in this context strikes me 
as ahistorical, because it presumes a norm or sequence according to which events unfold, 
whereas the events in St. Petersburg amid the exigencies of the Great War were of course distinct 
from the events that unfolded in Paris in the summer of 1789. But then again, while there is no 
revolutionary logic that exists outside of history, there is a revolutionary script that is inherited 
from history. That is, the participants in the Russian Revolution (as well as its subsequent 
historians) were well aware of the tradition that provided the backdrop for their actions (and 
interpretations), and there are numerous ways in which that tradition shaped their behaviors (and 
our histories). So while there is no abstract “logic” that explains the radicalizations of 1789 and 
1917, there are ways in which the events of the former influenced the latter: for instance, when 
contemporaries (and, later, historians) understood Stalin’s terror as intrinsic to the revolution, 
because it accorded with a revolutionary narrative they had inherited from the example of France. 
Returning to your initial terms, these paired events – whether France in 1789 and Russia in 1917, 
or Huxley-Arnold in the 1880s and Snow-Leavis in the 1960s – were related to each other 
neither as variations on a theme, nor as entirely different concerns, but rather as historically 
specific episodes that unfolded against the backdrop of, and were informed by, inherited 
understandings of events that came before. 
 
YH: The year 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of Snow’s original lecture, which offers a good 
occasion for us to reflect on this topic. What activities did you participate in? What is your 
experience and impression?  
 
GO: You’re right, there were a great number of “two cultures” events this year. I myself 
participated in events at the New York Academy of Sciences, the JFK School at Harvard, and the 
Vol 4. No.3 September 2009                                      Journal of Cambridge Studies 
                                                                                      53 
 
CRASSH program in Cambridge, and I know of discussions that took place (or are soon to take 
place) at the Tate Modern, the London Science Museum, the Royal Society, Michigan State 
University, and the University of Maryland at Baltimore County – and I’m sure there are still 
others. This remarkable upsurge of interest testifies to the fact that, whatever faults we might 
register with Snow’s thesis or the way it has been discussed, The Two Cultures clearly raised a 
subject that people want to engage – and not only did Snow raise the subject, he also provided 
the terms through which these conversations continue to take place. That is a significant 
achievement, one that shows no signs of abating, and in that sense Snow’s place in intellectual 
history seems secure. 
 
As for the actual content of these discussions, it is not obvious how they relate to one another. 
They were each excellent events, but they struck me as so different from each other that it is 
difficult to say what connected them at all – other than the fact that they took Snow and The Two 
Cultures as their touchstone. For instance, the conference at the New York Academy was 
primarily a discussion about science, science education, and public policy in the United States, 
whereas the events at Harvard and Cambridge were more academic affairs about the 
relationships among disciplines. In fact, this tendency has been the most consistent feature of 
“two cultures” discussions since 1959: they begin by citing Snow and his lecture, before going 
on to discuss entirely different things. And that dynamic helps to answer the question of how 
Snow’s lecture commanded – and continues to command – such widespread attention: it 
identifies a topic that captures people’s attention, and then leaves them free to discuss whatever 
they want. 
 
In this sense the “two cultures” is, to paraphrase the historian Joan Scott’s famous essay on 
gender, both an empty and an overflowing category of analysis: empty because it carries no fixed 
and specific content, overflowing because it consequently has been (and continues to be) filled 
with an endless number of meanings. As a historian attending these events, I am interested not in 
participating in discussions that make claims about the meaning or significance of the two 
cultures, but rather in identifying the ways that just such claims have long proliferated and 
functioned. (An inclination that can have the result, I’m afraid, of making me a somewhat 
unwelcome guest.) 
 
YH: What do you think of the role of ‘public intellectuals’? Do you think Snow is a good public 
intellectual? According to your opinion, which role should or could public intellectuals play in a 
modern society? 
 
GO: Stefan Collini’s Absent Minds is the indispensable book on this subject, but I would say that 
the term can have its use if defined in the right way. The wrong way would be to contrast public 
intellectuals, who address broad audiences, against narrow specialists, who merely swap jargon, 
as if all scholars (indeed, all professionals) did not function in each capacity at different times of 
nearly every day. So the term is problematic if used as a weapon, to disparage scholars who 
possess specialized knowledge and employ technical language, but it can also have its use if it 
refers to figures who parlay their standing in a particular area to address broader topics of 
concern – which is precisely what C. P. Snow sought to do in his Rede Lecture. 
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
54 
 
But Snow actually poses a challenge as a public intellectual, one that helps to explain the 
resentment that his pronouncements inspired. When he delivered the Rede Lecture in 1959, 
Snow’s stature rested upon his work as a novelist, and in fact he had not practiced science for 
nearly a quarter of a century. So his license to speak derived from his literary reputation, yet the 
enthusiastic reception his lecture met partly owed to his image as a scientific intellectual. His 
standing to pronounce on science was thus wobbly, which is why scientists such as Yudkin and 
Polanyi so quickly distanced themselves from this man who presumed to speak for them, and 
why Leavis was tactically correct to aim his fire not at Snow’s claims about science, but at his 
work as a novelist – an assault that Leavis, one of the most distinguished literary critics of the 
twentieth century, was on solid ground to deliver. So Leavis’s attack may have been astonishing 
in its content and tone, but its focus on Snow’s fiction testifies to the fact that its author 
understood the workings of the function of what we have since come to call a “public 
intellectual.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
